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Abstract 
This Master’s thesis investigates the different impact on bank lending in China from banks with 
different ownership during the recent financial crisis in 2008 to 2009. This paper finds that 
foreign banks in China were generally lending less comparing to banks with joint ownership in 
non-crisis years, but they did not completely contract their credit supply when the recent financial 
crisis struck. Government banks were quite supportive during the financial crisis by increasing 
lending in corporate loans and in construction industry specifically. On the other hand, domestic 
private banks were the most supportive in the crisis as they have increased their credit supply 
significantly throughout the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis.  
 
This paper also studies how banks’ financial performance affected the bank lending in China 
during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis. Banks with considerable assets were more supportive in 
the latter year of the financial crisis and banks with high capitalization were generally lending 
more in real estate, construction and manufacture industries in 2008 but less in corporate loans in 
2009. Banks with high profitability changed their lending strategy during the financial crisis by 
curtailing lending in corporate loans as well as construction industry. In addition, banks with high 
solvency became stricter and more careful with their lending and banks with sufficient funding 
also became more selective in the credit supply in the second year of the recent financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past decade, there is significant change of ownership structure in banks in 
developing countries. According to Cull & Martinez Peria (2013), the foreign share of 
aggregate assets in developing countries’ banking industry has increased by twenty 
percentage points from 26% to 46% and the government ownership in banks has decreased by 
nine percentage points from 28% to 19% during the period of 1999 to 2009. From their study 
in the East Europe and South America, banks’ ownership structure has a significant influence 
on their lending patterns, especially during the time of crisis. 
 
Over the past two decades, China’s economy has been growing at a rapid pace. China is the 
second largest economy in the world in terms of GDP and the annual growth rate is still above 
7%. (The World Bank, 2015) As a result of the fast economic growth, there are four Chinese 
banks that are among the ten biggest banks in the world by market capitalization (Jiang et al, 
2013). Along with the fast growth in these two decades, China’s banking industry has 
undergone tremendous privatization and several reforms, which leads to big changes in banks’ 
ownership structure. Therefore, it is very interesting to study whether banks’ different 
ownership structure would have different impact on their lending patterns in the period of the 
recent financial crisis.  
 
Previous literature has suggested that foreign ownership enables banks in developing 
countries to become more efficient and more profitable. But during the time of crisis, they 
would also contract their lending earlier and decrease their lending more compared to the 
government-owned and domestic private banks. For example, In De Haas & Van Lelyveld 
(2014), they discovered that foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks worldwide (excl. 
China) had to curtail its credit supply three times as fast as domestic banks in the 2008 to 
2009 crisis. In addition, in Cull & Martinez Peria (2013), domestic private banks in both Latin 
America and Eastern Europe have contracted their credit supply; Moreover, foreign banks in 
Eastern Europe have declined even more in the lending than that of domestic private banks. 
Whereas in Latin America, government banks are giving out more loans than foreign banks 
and domestic private banks. Similar evidence was also found in Russia, where Fungacova et 
al. (2013) has uncovered that foreign banks in Russia have decreased more in the lending 
growth and Russian government banks have increased the growth of the credit supply during 
the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis relative to domestic private banks. 
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With respect to the contribution of this paper to the existing literature on this topic, to the 
author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first study about bank ownership and bank lending 
during the recent financial crisis in China. In addition, this thesis is the first to use loans by 
industries to study the differences of banks’ credit supply to the four major industries in China. 
 
In this thesis, how banks’ ownership structure affects their lending patterns during the non-
crisis years and crisis years in the recent financial crisis for an extended period from 2005 to 
2012 is examined. The lending patterns are characterized as the growth of total gross loans, 
growth of corporate as well as private loans and growth of loans to the four major industries 
(real estate, construction, wholesale & retail, manufacture industries). The sample data is 
constructed of 176 foreign and domestic commercial banks in China from year 2005 to 2012. 
 
The results of this thesis suggest that foreign banks in China were generally lending less in 
non-crisis years than domestic banks, but they did not completely contract their credit supply 
when the recent financial crisis struck. On the other hand, government-owned banks were 
found to be supportive during the period of financial crisis by increasing their lending in 
corporate loans. In addition, domestic private banks are shown to be more supportive than 
government banks by increasing their credit supply in total gross loans throughout the 2008 to 
2009 financial crisis. Additionally, this paper also studies how banks’ financial performance 
affected the bank lending during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis. Banks with considerable 
assets were more supportive in the latter year of the financial crisis and banks with high 
capitalization were generally lending more in real estate, construction and manufacture 
industries in 2008 but less in corporate loans in 2009. Banks with high profitability changed 
their lending strategy during the financial crisis by curtailing lending in both corporate loans 
and construction industry. Moreover, banks with high solvency became stricter and more 
careful with their lending and banks with sufficient funding also became more selective in the 
credit supply in the latter year of the recent financial crisis. 
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1.1 Review of Chinese banking history 
 
In order to study this topic in depth, it is imperative to understand the current structure of the 
banking industry in China. Therefore, a brief review of the development of Chinese banking 
system is presented below.  
 
China’s banking reform started in 1978. Before that, the central bank (People’s Bank of China) 
was the only bank in China, which is known as the mono-bank model. The People’s Bank of 
China administered the financial system as well as performed all financial service duties. (Lin 
& Zhang, 2009) The initial reform in 1978 aimed at making the banking system more 
profitable and more efficient by devolving the People’s Bank of China into several banks with 
specializations. This reform has created the “Big Four” state-owned banks, which are the 
Bank of China (BOC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Construction Bank of 
China (CBC) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). The “Big Four” are 
the largest commercial banks in China till today and they also compete with each other in 
raising and allocating capital. While the People’s Bank of China concentrates on its duties as 
the central bank of China, which are mainly being in charge of controlling monetary supply as 
well as issuing currency. (Lin & Zhang, 2009) 
 
The second reform was an ownership reform from the latter half of 1980s till early 1990s. 
Chinese-foreign joint ownership in commercial banks was introduced and domestic joint 
equity banks started to appear in the same period. In the meanwhile, another state-owned bank, 
Bank of Communication (this was a bank with long history but was consolidated after 1949) 
was restructured and became the fifth biggest state-owned commercial bank in China. 
Additionally, with the booming of stock market, in 1991, a domestic joint equity bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank (later changed its name to Pingan Bank in 2012), was the first 
bank that became listed and partially publicly owned. Also, three policy banks were created 
during this time because of the need of reducing the burden of financing trade at state level as 
well as development projects from the commercial banks. (Lin & Zhang, 2009) 
 
The third reform was to solve the large amount of non-performing loans because of 
government-directed lending and also the need to improve the internal control of the banks. In 
the late 1990s, the government injected 27 billion RMB into the “Big Four” state-owned 
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banks and four new asset management companies were established to transfer and repackage 
the non-performing loans. (Lin & Zhang, 2009) 
 
Due to implementation of the new regulations (the Central Bank Law and the Commercial 
Bank Law), many urban and rural cooperatives started to merge into city or rural commercial 
banks. In 2000s, the “Big Four” state-owned banks and more joint equity banks became listed 
and more foreign shares as well as foreign management were accepted in the commercial 
banks. After 2006, city commercial banks were allowed to expand their operations outside of 
their municipal regions and this has increased the competition as the city commercial banks 
try to attract and take in more customers that were out of their reach before.  
 
As of now, the first tier commercial banks are the five state-owned banks, which include the 
“Big Four” and the Bank of Communication. They are still the largest commercial banks in 
China. The second tier commercial banks are the twelve joint equity banks. Then the third tier 
commercial banks are more than a hundred of city commercial banks and large rural 
commercial banks. There are still many rural cooperatives in rural regions of China and many 
of them are also financed or started by bigger city or rural commercial banks. These smaller 
cooperatives are not included in the sample for this Master’s thesis because of the difficulty of 
retrieving their information and also the scope of the rural cooperatives is comparatively 
trivial. 
 
Foreign banks have had a long history in China as they entered China as early as nineteenth 
century when the Opium War opened the gate of trade in China, who was still governed by 
Qing Dynasty at that time. Many of foreign banks from that period are still active in the 
Chinese banking industry today, such as Standard Chartered, HSBC, Deutsche Bank (China), 
Credit Agricole CIB (China), and Citibank. But after 1949, their participation in Mainland 
China was very limited; many of them moved their offices to Hong Kong or Taiwan. As 
mentioned earlier, started in the 1980s, some Chinese-foreign joint equity banks were created 
and many more banks also accepted foreign shares injection as well as foreign management. 
Starting in the end of 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has begun the 
approvals of foreign banks’ registrations of incorporating locally                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
in Mainland China. This gesture made China more open and attractive to foreign banks. By 
2012, there were at least 15 foreign banks locally incorporated. Moreover, many more foreign 
banks are opening their branches and representative offices in China. 
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: in Section 2, previous academic literatures 
related to this thesis topic are discussed. In Section 3, the hypotheses of this study are 
explained. In Section 4, the process of data collection and method used for analyzing the data 
are introduced. In Section 5, the empirical results are explained and robustness check of the 
model is performed. In the final section, conclusions are drawn and potential extensions are 
considered. 
  
8 
2. Literature Review 
 
Many previous researches on bank ownership during non-crisis years suggest that in 
developing countries, state-owned banks are less efficient comparing to domestic private 
banks and foreign banks. During non-crisis time, it is generally believed that foreign banks 
and domestic private banks tend to perform better than that of state-owned banks. For 
example, Jiang et al. (2013) has studied that city commercial banks and joint-equity 
commercial banks outperform state-owned banks significantly in China. The privatization 
reform has enabled many banks to be more efficient in terms of revenue inflows. In addition, 
the commercial banks that have minority foreign ownership also have a significant positive 
long-term effect. What’s more, Bonin et al. (2005) studied 11 transition countries from 1996 
to 2000, and they found out that foreign banks are more cost-efficient and they also provide 
better services compare to other banks. Another research by De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2010) 
also showed that if the host country has a domestic crisis, the foreign banks’ credit supply in 
the host country is not necessarily affected.  
 
However, more recent researches after the 2008-2009 financial crisis have discovered that 
government banks and domestic private banks supported the local economy more by 
sustaining or even increasing their credit supply growth; Because of the vast scope of this 
financial crisis, foreign banks tended to contract their credit supply very early during the crisis 
for self-protection. The explanation of the credit supply decrease by foreign banks are mainly 
due to funding decrease from parent banks, more prudent and careful lending during crisis 
and it was also affected by the proximity between the foreign subsidiaries and parent 
multinational banks. Some of these researches are discussed in the following sessions. 
 
2.1 Global level evidence 
 
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2014) discovered that during the recent 2008 to 2009 financial 
crisis, 48 largest multinational banks’ 199 foreign subsidiaries all around the world (excl. 
China) had to reduce credit supply three times as fast comparing to domestic banks. When the 
crisis is domestic, the parent banks can provide sufficient funding to their foreign subsidiaries 
to ease with the pressure from the crisis. (De Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2010) However, when the 
scope of the crisis becomes global and the multinational parent banks are also under the 
influences of the financial crisis, then the foreign subsidiaries cannot get sufficient strong 
  
9 
support from the parent multinational banks during the economic downturn. In conclusion of 
their latest and previous researches, they believe that the multinational banks subsidiaries 
support and stabilize the local economies when there are domestic crises. However, with the 
presence of a global financial crisis, the multinational banks transmit the shocks to the local 
markets and contract their credit supply aggressively. 
 
Micco & Panizza (2006) has studied whether state banks’ state ownership would correlate 
with the lending patterns over business cycle and the scope of this research is worldwide. 
They found out that government banks’ lending tends to be less responding to 
macroeconomic shocks comparing to domestic and foreign private banks. This behavior is 
mainly due to government banks play a credit smoothing role, which suggests that state-
owned banks have credit stabilization as their objective function and depositors view 
government banks as more reliable choices during a crisis and therefore state-owned banks 
are better at supplying smooth credit. In the meanwhile, it is also considered that state-owned 
banks’ management lack the incentive to react to the shocks and they tend to have “lazy” 
behavior and politicians may use the credit supply to ensure re-election.  
 
2.2 Regional level evidence 
 
On the regional level, recent research by The World Bank has shown that in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America, the financial crisis in 2008 – 2009 has incurred significant decline in the 
growth rate of bank lending. In this crisis, the two regions also demonstrated differences of 
how banks’ different ownership structures affect the bank lending in the financial crisis. 
Firstly, the domestic private banks have decreased their loan supply in both regions during the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. In Eastern Europe, the foreign banks contracted more on their 
credit supply relative to domestic private banks during that period, as there is conspicuous 
reduction in corporate loans. Whereas in Latin America, the government-owned banks 
supplied comparatively more loans than that of domestic private banks and foreign banks, 
which is shown by the higher growth in the credit supply during the period of crisis. (Cull & 
Martinez Peria, 2013) In the same article, they also explained the differences in bank behavior 
across different regions to some extent. They believed that in both Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, the distance or proximity between the foreign subsidiaries and their parent banks 
play an important role in the regional different results. 
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There is also a relevant research that studies foreign banks’ credit supply in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) during the financial crisis. (Kamil & Rai, 2010) They have 
discovered that the foreign banks in LAC region were more resilient than that of foreign 
banks in other regions during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis. And this is due to that foreign 
banks’ lending is more resilient when their lending in LAC is by the local currency in the host 
country. In addition, foreign banks deposit funding in LAC also originated from the domestic 
market. Moreover, the lending itself was carried out by the domestic subsidiaries. 
 
De Haas et al. (2013) has also done a relevant research in Eastern Europe regarding the banks 
that have joined the Vienna Initiative. Vienna Initiative is an agreement signed by 
multinational banks from Western Europe that binds the multinational parent banks’ 
commitment to their foreign subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. Therefore, even during crisis, the 
parent banks would still be a strengthening source for the foreign subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe. As a result, they found that both foreign banks and domestic banks have decreased 
their credit supply aggressively during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis. However, the foreign 
subsidiary banks that were under protection of Vienna Initiative had no significant negative 
lending in the period of crisis. Hence, it also proves that the credit supply from foreign banks’ 
subsidiaries can be affected negatively by their parent multinational banks when the crisis 
also reaches their home market. 
 
Another research is from Cetorelli & Goldberg (2011), it has uncovered that during the recent 
financial crisis, the credit supply in emerging markets was affected significantly by foreign 
banks. These markets include emerging Asia, emerging Europe and Latin America. There 
were contractions in direct and cross-border lending as well as local lending from foreign 
banks and foreign banks that are affiliated in the local emerging markets. At the same time, 
due to a decrease in interbank and cross-border lending, domestic banks also reduced their 
credit supply because of funding shock.  
 
Additionally, Mihaljek (2010) has studied how the recent financial crisis affected banks that 
operate in emerging market by using survey data of 21 countries from Asia, Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe as well as other emerging market economies. The bank operations 
are measured in terms of funding, lending and liquidity adjustments. As a result, the research 
has discovered that the domestic and foreign banks behaved similarly in a broad sense. The 
author found that the banks adjusted their funding operations by decreasing their reliance on 
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wholesale market and increasing their effort in absorbing retail deposits. For liquidity 
adjustment, banks reduced interbank activities and the maturity of the bank lending. In the 
meanwhile, they also increased business with central banks. As respect to the lending 
operations, the banks decreased their credit supply to corporate as well as consumer loans; 
instead, they shifted their lending focus towards loans that are less risky and government 
bonds. Starting from August 2007, most banks’ total assets and loans growth were slowing 
down and growth of total loans declined sharply thereafter. Corporate loans growth decreased 
sharply in all emerging market whereas consumer loans’ decrease was relatively moderate in 
Asia but worse in other emerging market regions. Public sector lending, on the other hand, 
was increased in Latin America and was decreased in other emerging market regions. Many 
central banks in these regions that have both low and high presence of foreign banks reported 
that there was no conspicuous difference in how domestic and foreign banks react to the 
financial crisis. Minor differences exist in some particular countries. In Thailand, foreign 
banks reduced their consumer loans and increased secured lending whereas domestic banks 
increased their household loans and remained secured lending unchanged. In Singapore, some 
foreign banks reduced their credit supply to “non-core customers”. In Saudi Arabia, as some 
foreign banks encountered liquidity problem from the headquarters, the local lending 
operation was limited to certain industries. However, countries with moderate foreign banks 
presence exhibit lending policy differences of how domestic and foreign banks react to the 
recent financial crisis. In general, foreign banks in these countries decreased their lending 
faster than the private domestic banks. On the other hand, government banks increased their 
lending and it partially offset the decrease from the foreign banks and domestic private banks. 
 
2.3 Country level evidence 
 
On the country level, relevant literature has found that foreign banks tend to be “lack of 
loyalty” by studies conducted in Czech Republic and Poland. Thus, it is easier for them to 
pull back from the lending during economic difficulties in the host countries compared to the 
domestic banks. (Weill, 2003) This theory is confirmed by Fungacova et al. (2013). They 
used quarterly banking data from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2009 from Russia; 
where there is a banking system consists of many state-owned banks, foreign banks and also 
domestic private banks. The results have shown that the credit supply has reduced during that 
period in an overall level. Nevertheless, they found that the state-owned banks tend to support 
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the economy more during the 2008-2009 financial downturn as the decline in their credit 
supply is significantly less comparing to domestic private banks and foreign banks. 
  
Coleman & Feler (2014) studied how bank ownership affects the bank lending during the 
recent financial crisis in Brazil. They have found that private banks have changed their 
operation strategy to be more conservative during the recent financial crisis in 2008 to 2009. 
Firstly, the private banks experienced sharp decrease in their deposit funding. Secondly, the 
private banks also reduced the portion of deposit funding that they would use for credit supply. 
As a result, the drop in credit supply by the private banks were quite aggressive. However, 
government banks actually helped to mitigate the negative impact from the financial crisis 
shocks. During the recent financial crisis, government banks provided more credit even 
though they also experienced decline in their deposits. The difference between government 
bank lending and private bank lending has helped offsetting the aggregate decline in bank 
lending in Brazil during the financial crisis. The credit increase has been disproportionally 
helpful in various areas of Brazilian economy throughout the crisis, relative to areas with less 
lending from government banks. The areas that benefited from the government lending 
includes local employment, production, incomes and local establishments etc. The estimated 
economic growth, incomes and number of establishments would be much lower if it was not 
for the increased credit supply from the government banks. However, the paper also finds it to 
be uncertain and it has a critical view that whether the government banks’ intervention would 
be positive and beneficial for the Brazilian economy in the long term. 
 
There is also a study from Israel about the bank owernship’s effect on bank lending during the 
recent financial crisis. According to their findings, local Israeli banks were not affected by the 
finanical crisis. As the financial crisis was spread from international investments and 
international financial institutions, Israeli domestic banks do not have much shares from 
international parties. Therefore, they kept through the crisis stably. Foreign banks in Israel is 
still during infancy period, the operations in the Israeli market is through opening up 
representative offices, branches or subsidiaries, which is similar to the situation in China 
before the end of year 2006. Because of the financial crisis, the foreign banks in Israel have 
altered their operating strategy in the local market. For example, CitiBank and HSBC 
curtailed their credit supply to Israeli’s corporate borrowers in the first half of year 2009. 
However, there are also foreign banks that actually expanded their credit supply during the 
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crisis. For example, Citibank started lending to personal loans and BNP Paribas opened up a 
new subsidiary in Israel. (Marzuk, 2009) 
 
 
In conclusion of all the prior researches that are relevant to this topic, most of them found 
government banks to be supportive and have an effect of stablizing the economy during the 
crisis. On the other hand, foreign banks are less supportive during the recent financial crisis in 
general and they tend to contract their lending faster. For domestic private banks, there are 
mixed results as in some cases they are supportive, whereas in other cases, they are not. 
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3. Hypotheses 
 
Based on all researches discussed in the previous section, it is very interesting to extend the 
research of whether the banks’ ownership can have impact on banks’ lending pattern during 
the recent financial crisis from 2008 to 2009 in China. As suggested in the literature review, 
foreign banks tended to contract their lending during a crisis with big scope similar to the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. On the other hand, government-owned banks would increase 
their lending to support the economy during the crisis period. Domestic private banks should 
be supplying loans somewhere in between government-owned banks and foreign banks. 
Therefore, the hypotheses of this thesis are that foreign banks in China reduced the growth 
rate of their credit supply and government-owned banks as well as domestic private banks 
reduced less or even increased their credit supply growth during the 2008 to 2009 financial 
crisis. 
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4. Methodology and Data 
 
This section describes the research method and data collection process in detail. First, the 
research method is presented. Then there is an introduction of how the data is retrieved, 
followed by definition and description of the variables used in the model.  
 
4.1 Method 
 
Similar to Cull & Martinez Peria (2013), the empirical model in this thesis includes 
ownership variables, crisis year variables and banks’ financial variables. The equation below 
describes the baseline empirical model used to examine the impact of banks’ ownership on 
their lending patterns: 
 
Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2008𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2009𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2008𝑡 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2008𝑡
× 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2008𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2009𝑡
× 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2009𝑡 × 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠_2009𝑡
× 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑏 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 
 Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡 represents the annual change in percentage growth of total gross loans, or one of 
corporate loans, private loans, real estate loans, construction loans, wholesale & retail 
loans or manufacture loans) for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
 𝛽0 is the constant in the model. 𝛽1…𝛽11are the coefficients. 𝛽𝑘is the coefficient vector. 
 Foreign, Government and DomesticPrivate are dummy variables that have a value of 
1 if the banks are foreign-owned, government-owned or private-owned by domestic 
parties. If all of them are 0, it means the bank does not have a majority share from any 
of the three above-stated ownership and these banks would be banks with “joint 
ownership”. 
 Crisis_2008 and Crisis_2009 are dummy variables that equal to 1 if the year is 2008 
or 2009. Other years would have a value of 0.  
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 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a matrix variable that contains all the other factors that affect banks’ lending 
pattern and it is lagged one period. These factors include bank size, equity ratio, 
profitability, liquidity ratio and deposit funding ratio.  
 𝑐𝑡 represents time fixed effects and 𝑐𝑏represents bank fixed effects. Inclusion of the 
fixed effects would help to capture or control for time specific effects (such as 
differences between years) and bank specific effects (variations among different 
banks).  
 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term of the regression. 
 i = 1,…, n, where n is the number of banks in the sample. 
 t = 1,…, 𝑇𝑖, where 𝑇𝑖is the number of year for bank i in the sample. 
 
There is possibility that the banks’ financial variables have different impact on the growth of 
credit supply instead of ownership variables during crisis years and non-crisis year. Therefore, 
the model is estimated in several specifications with robust standard errors in order to control 
for both macro effects on the growth of bank lending by including fixed effects and the 
interactions between the crisis dummy variables and the financial data variables. Thus, for 
each loan growth variable, there would be six specifications, which are 
 
I. Baseline estimation that is without bank or time fixed effects, nor interactions between 
crisis dummy variables and financial data variables. 
II. Year fixed effects are included in the baseline estimation. 
III. Specification II and inclusion of interaction between crisis dummy variables and 
financial data variables. 
IV. Baseline estimation and the interaction between crisis dummy variables and financial 
data variables. 
V. Specification IV with bank fixed effects. 
VI. Specification IV with both bank fixed effects and time fixed effects. 
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4.2 Data
1
 
 
The sample consists of 176 commercial banks operating in China between year 2005 and 
2012. The main source of the data is Bankscope database and banks’ annual reports. 
Bankscope is a database that provides banks’ financial statements, ratings and intelligence 
information by the Bureau Van Dijk. Banks’ annual reports were downloaded from banks’ 
homepages or from the newspaper where the banks’ annual reports were published. The data 
sources are mixed because Bankscope does not have complete data for every commercial 
bank in China. For example, for city commercial banks in China, much of the data is not 
available in Bankscope. Therefore, the data of many city commercial banks was manually 
collected from the banks’ annual reports. In addition, not every bank publishes their annual 
reports online and many banks only provide the latest annual report from recent two or three 
years. Moreover, a small part of the data also comes from the Chinese Almanac of Finance. 
Nevertheless, the author exhausted all kinds of effort to make sure to obtain as much data as 
possible to ensure the accuracy of the sample. Nonetheless, the panel data is unbalanced as 
not every year’s data is available.  
 
All financial data collected, such as loans, assets, profits, equity and deposit funding data 
were collected in unit of millions of CNY. In cases where the data were reported in other 
currencies, they were converted to the Chinese currency CNY by using Bankscope’s annual 
currency conversion rates to ensure the consistency.  
 
The explanatory variable used in the model is the bank lending variable, which includes the 
annual growth in percentages of total gross loans, corporate loans, consumer loans, loans to 
real estate, loans to construction, loans to retail & wholesale and loans to manufacture 
industries. The data of loans by industries and the data of banks’ ownership are only available 
from banks’ annual reports, thus these data were entirely manually collected. Unlike Cull & 
Martinez Peria (2013), in this paper, the banks’ ownership is categorized into state-owned 
banks, foreign banks, domestic private banks and also joint-ownership banks
2
, based on 
whether the majority share (50% or more) is owned by the government, foreign parties, 
                                                        
1
 The data was collected for research purpose for The Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in 
Transition. All rights belong to The Bank of Finland. 
2 Joint-ownership bank here refers to the bank without majority ownership from foreign, government 
or domestic private parties 
  
18 
domestic private parties or none of the three types of shares has majority control of the bank, 
respectively. Detail definitions and description of the variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Variables by definition and unit: 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, all bank lending variables were measured as annual growth rate in 
percentage in order to capture the annual change of credit supply. Ownership variables are 
dummy variables in comparison to the banks without a majority holding from foreign, 
government or private domestic parties. Besides ownership, other financial variables that may 
affect lending growth were also controlled. Bank size is measured by log of assets. The equity 
ratio measures the capitalization of the banks. Bank profitability is measured by return on 
assets; Liquidity is measured by liquid assets to total assets. And deposit funding ratio is 
measured by total deposits and short-term funding to assets. All financial variables are lagged 
one year so that they can better explain the bank lending change in the following year. Next, 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of variables: 
 
 
 
The total gross loan shows an annual growth of 29.60% on average and the average annual 
growth rate of corporate loans is quite similar to that of the total gross loan. However, other 
types of loans exhibit higher growth, especially private loans and retail & wholesale loans, 
which are 69.56% and 73.51% annually, respectively. Then they are followed by growth rates 
of construction loans at 49.92% and real estate loans at 31.07%. The manufacture loans are 
the industry that is growing slowest among the four chosen industries and it is growing at a 
rate of 31.07% annually on average.  
 
Based on ownership observations, 15% are foreign banks, 15% are government banks, 39% 
are domestic private banks and the remaining are observations of banks that are joint 
ownership without majority share from foreign, government or domestic private parties. In 
addition, the bank size is measured by log of assets and it is averaged as 10.88. The average 
equity ratio is 9%, return on assets is 1%, liquidity ratio is 30% and the deposit funding ratio 
is 86% on average over from year 2005 to 2012. 
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In this dataset, the total banking assets were around 29 trillion CNY in 2005 and over seven 
years, it reached at around 102 trillion CNY. The assets CAGR between 2005 and 2012 is 
approximately 20%. Graph 1 below shows the total bank assets by different ownerships.  
 
Graph 1  
Total Bank Assets by ownership 2005 - 2012 
 
 
 
As can been seen from the graph, state ownership is still the dominant power in the banking 
industry even after the privatization reform. But its asset proportion in the industry has been 
gradually declining over the years. Domestic-ownership banks assets are seen with steady 
growth year by year. Foreign banks’ assets are comparatively small as to the whole Chinese 
banking industry, but their assets have been increasing since 2007 after the CBRC regulation 
change. 
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To see how the total gross loans have been growing over the sample years by different 
ownership types, Graph 2 displays the trend below: 
 
Graph 2 
Bank lending growth by ownerships 
 
The graph shows the annual growth of total gross loans from year 2006 to 2012. The credit 
supply growth is presented in average percentage increase. For each year’s observation, from 
left to right, the bars of ownership represent foreign ownership, government ownership, 
domestic private ownership and joint ownership, respectively. 
 
 
 
As depicted in the graph, the growth of total gross loan of foreign banks rocketed in 2007 
when the China Banking Regulatory Commission opened up the Chinese market completely 
to foreign banks’ registrations in Mainland China in December 2006, but the growth then 
plummeted in 2008 because of the global financial crisis. In 2009, the decrease in the total 
gross loans growth of foreign banks has slowed down. However, it was still less than the 
growth of the total gross loans from domestic banks (both government-owned and private). 
After the financial crisis, foreign banks’ lending has recovered and it has shown a big increase 
in 2010. In 2011, the growth of gross loans from foreign banks was negative and it was 
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mainly due to the macro-control policy from the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC). The CBRC requires all commercial banks operating in China to meet certain criteria. 
Loan-deposit ratio requirement is one of them. The required loan-deposit ratio should be at 
maximum 75% and all foreign banks operating in China were required to meet that standard 
in five years when the CBRC started allowing foreign banks local incorporation in China 
(meaning all foreign banks has to meet the loan-deposit ratio criteria by the end of 2011). As 
recorded in the end of 2010, the aggregate loan-deposit ratio of all foreign banks was 86%. 
(Nie, 2012) Therefore, in 2011, many foreign banks suppressed their lending and made an 
effort to attract more deposits. Nevertheless, based on the graph, foreign banks’ credit supply 
growth was indeed less than domestic banks during the financial crisis in both 2008 and 2009.  
 
In addition, it is noteworthy that the government banks had higher credit supply growth than 
both domestic private banks and foreign banks in 2008, whereas in 2009 the domestic private 
banks had higher growth than the other three ownership categories. Relative to the growth 
before 2008, government banks had higher growth in both 2008 and 2009, whereas domestic 
banks had slower growth in 2008 but higher growth in 2009. Moreover, throughout the whole 
observation period, joint ownership banks tend to be quite consistent over the years and they 
have sustained their credit supply during the financial crisis or even lent more than other years 
in 2008 according to the graph. 
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5. Analysis and Results 
 
In this section, the model estimation results are presented and analyzed. Table 4 to Table 11 
present the regression results from the six bank lending estimations with six specifications of 
the model with robust standard error and they are followed by interpretations of the results. 
 
Before running the regressions, it is essential to check the correlation of the financial 
variables that are included in the model to make sure that they are not highly correlated with 
each other, or else it might affect the regression’s results. A Pearson’s correlation table listed 
as follows in Table 3: 
 
Table 3 
Correlations of financial variables in the model: 
 
 
 
The correlations between the financial variables are all smaller than 0.5, thus, it is not likely 
that the financial variables would intervene with each other in the regression model. 
 
5.1 The growth of total gross loans 
 
As the financial variables are not highly correlated with each other, the first estimation 
regarding the growth of the total gross loans can be conducted. The estimation results are 
listed in Table 4 as follows: 
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Based on the results of the regressions, it is noteworthy to see that foreign ownership has 
significant negative effect on the growth of total gross loans during non-crisis years. 
Comparing to banks without majority control from any of foreign, government or domestic 
private ownership, foreign banks show 62% to 72% less growth in total gross loans. In the 
meanwhile, government banks show 3% to 7% higher growth in total gross loans than joint 
ownership banks and domestic private banks show 3% to 5% less growth than banks with 
joint ownership during non-crisis years, however, these two results are insignificant. The 
banks’ logged assets from the year before also seem to have a negative impact of around -3% 
on the growth of the total gross loans and it is slightly significant when year fixed effect and 
interactions between crisis variables and financial variables are controlled. Banks’ 
capitalization, profitability, liquidity that are lagged one year all show significant impact on 
the growth of total gross loans. Banks’ capitalization that is measured by equity ratio has 
more than 100% positive effect and liquidity has three to four times positive effect on the 
growth of total gross loans. However, profitability has around 15 to 23 times negative effects 
on the growth of total gross loans.  
 
As of the years during the financial crisis, year 2008 seems to have negative effect on the 
growth of the total gross loans and year 2009 has a positive effect on the growth of the total 
gross loans. Nevertheless, the effects are insignificant. In 2008, comparing to joint ownership 
banks, foreign ownership has mixed results; government banks tend to have 26% to 27% 
higher significant growth and domestic private banks have 12% higher significant growth in 
total gross loans. In year 2009, comparing to joint ownership, foreign ownership and 
government ownership have mixed results; domestic private banks have 17% higher 
significant growth in total gross loans. 
 
For the financial variables, in 2008, bank size has negative effect on the growth of the total 
gross loan, which is consistent with the effect during non-crisis years; Equity ratio tends to 
have mixed effect and profitability has positive effect. Liquidity in 2007 has a significant 
negative impact of twice as less on the growth of total gross loans in 2008. Deposit funding in 
2007 tend to have positive effect on the growth of total gross loans in 2008 and it is 
significant in one of the specifications. In 2009, on contrary to year 2008, bank size has 
positive effect on the growth of the total gross loan, and it is significant in one of the 
specifications. The regression results suggest that bank size in 2008 has a positive influence 
on the growth of the total gross loans in 2009. From the same year, equity ratio tends to have 
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mixed effect as the results from year 2008. Profitability in 2008 has positive effect on the 
growth of total gross loans in 2009 and the result is significant in one of the specifications. 
Similar to the results from year 2008, Liquidity in 2008 has a significant negative impact of 
two to three times less on the growth of total gross loans in 2009. Deposit funding in 2008 
tend to have mixed results on the growth of total gross loans in 2009.  
 
Based on the regression results that are significant, it is possible to infer that foreign 
ownership tends to have a significant negative effect on the growth of the total gross loans 
during non-crisis years by comparing to joint ownership, whether year fixed effect is included 
or not. Other financial data, such as equity ratio, liquidity ratio and deposit funding ratio, they 
all have significant positive impact on the growth of total gross loans. However, bank size and 
profitability have significant negative impact on the growth of the total gross loans. In 2008, 
domestic private banks have significant higher growth of total gross loans than joint 
ownership banks. In the same year, Liquidity has significant negative impact and deposit 
funding has significant positive impact on the growth of total gross loans. In 2009, domestic 
private banks have significant higher growth of total gross loans than joint ownership banks. 
In the same year, size and profitability have significant positive impact on the growth of the 
total gross loans, whereas liquidity has significant negative impact on the growth of total 
gross loans. Constants from the regressions are all significant and R-squared values range 
from 55% to 58%.  
 
In order to check the robustness of the estimation model above, another estimation with 
robust standard deviation is conducted and the estimation results are presented in Table 5: 
 
  
27 
 
  
28 
Similar as the first estimation, most significant coefficients from the first estimation are still 
significant with robust standard errors and the results indicate similar interpretations. 
Therefore, the estimation model seems to be quite reliable. During non-crisis years, banks 
with foreign ownership have significant less growth in the total gross loans comparing to 
banks with joint ownership. For financial variables, profitability has significant negative 
impact and liquidity has significant positive impact on the growth of the total gross loans. In 
2008, higher liquidity in 2007 has negative impact in the growth of total gross loans in 2008. 
In 2009, higher profitability in 2009 would lead to higher growth in the total gross loans in 
2009 and higher liquidity in 2008 has negative impact on the growth of the total gross loans.  
 
There are several inferences based on the estimation results on the growth of total gross loans. 
Firstly, banks with foreign ownership have had slower growth that ranges from -71% to -62% 
in total gross loans than banks with joint ownership banks in non-crisis years at 1% statistical 
significance level. This result is consistent with Cull & Martinez Peria (2013)’s finding from 
Latin America, where the foreign banks were lending 9% to 11% less than that of domestic 
private banks before the crisis. During crisis years, there is no clear evidence that foreign 
banks have either higher or lower growth in the total gross loans.  
 
Secondly, banks with government ownership had 27% significant higher growth in the total 
gross loans at 5% statistical significance level than banks with joint ownership in 2008. Again, 
this result is also consistent with Cull & Martinez Peria (2013)’s finding in the Latin America, 
where the government banks were lending around 28% more than domestic private banks in 
year 2008. Thirdly, banks with domestic private ownership tended to show a higher growth in 
the total gross loans than the banks with joint ownership during the crisis.  
 
Additionally, during non-crisis years, big banks as measured by log of assets tended to have 
three times less significant growth of total gross loans during non-crisis years but increased 
the growth of the total gross loans to 5% in 2009. Similar results are uncovered in Cull & 
Martinez Peria (2013)’s finding in the Latin America, where the big banks were lending less 
before crisis but then increased their credit supply significantly in both year 2008 and 2009. 
Also, banks with higher profitability from the year before would have lower growth in the 
total credit supply during non-crisis years. However, in 2009, banks with higher profitability 
also had higher growth in the total gross loans. It indicates that profitable banks were 
increasing their credit supply more in 2009 than in other years. On the other hand, banks with 
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higher solvency tended to lend more during non-crisis years but less during the financial crisis. 
Moreover, banks with higher capitalization were lending at the same growth rate throughout 
the observation duration. There is no clear evidence that the growth of the total gross lending 
has decreased during the crisis years.  
 
5.2 The growth of corporate and private loans 
 
After the investigation of the growth of total gross loans, it is also interesting to see whether 
there are lending differences in corporate and private loans separately. It enables us to see the 
origins of the differences in the estimations of total gross loans model as well. By using the 
same equation as before, regressions on the growth of corporate loans and also private loans 
were conducted and the regression results are listed as in Table 6 and Table 7. 
 
5.2.1 The growth of corporate loans 
 
During non-crisis years, it can be seen that banks with foreign ownership tend to have a lower 
growth of the corporate loans than the banks with joint ownership during non-crisis years. 
Banks with government ownership tend to have a higher growth of corporate loans than the 
banks with joint ownership during non-crisis years. Banks with domestic private ownership 
tend to have around 18% less growth in corporate loans comparing to the banks with joint 
ownership and the coefficient is significant at 10% statistical significance level in one of the 
specifications.  
 
Banks size and deposit funding has mixed results, thus, it is unable to infer from these 
coefficients. Equity ratio has around three times more positive impact on the growth of 
corporate loans and it is significant at 10% statistical significance level in one of the 
specifications. Profitability has around 100 times more positive effect on the growth of 
corporate loans and most of the coefficients are significant at 5% statistical significance level. 
Liquidity is shown to have a negative impact on the growth of corporate loans. 
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In crisis years, year 2008 seems to have negative influence on the growth of corporate loans, 
whereas year 2009 has mixed results. In addition, foreign ownership shows mixed results in 
both crisis years and government ownership show mixed results in 2009. However, banks 
with government ownership have 1.3 to 1.9 times of higher growth of corporate loans than 
joint ownership banks in 2008. Domestic private banks show higher growth in corporate loans 
in both years and the difference is significant in 2009 with 40% to 60% higher growth.  
 
Bank size has 20% to 34% significant negative impact on the growth of corporate loans in 
2008. In 2009, bank size has mixed results. Equity ratio has positive impact on the growth of 
corporate loans in 2008 but negative impact in 2009. The negative impact in 2009 is shown 
by more than seven times less growth of corporate loans and it is significant at 10% statistical 
significance level. Profitability has significant negative influence on the growth of corporate 
loans in both crisis years, which is 90 times less and 120 times less in 2008 and 2009, 
respectively. In 2008, liquidity has around 11 to 13 times higher significant effect on the 
growth of corporate loans. Whereas in 2009, liquidity has more than 3 times less significant 
effect on the growth of corporate loans. In terms of deposit funding ratio, it has positive 
impact on the growth of corporate loans in both crisis years. The values of R-squared range 
from 40% to 59%. 
 
In conclusion, banks with government ownership had 1.3 to 1.9 times higher significant 
growth of corporate loans than banks with joint ownership in 2008. This result is consistent 
with Cull & Martinez Peria (2013)’s finding in the Latin America, where government banks 
are lending more than domestic private banks in year 2008. Additionally, banks with domestic 
private ownership had 41% to 60% higher significant growth of corporate loans than banks 
with joint ownership in 2009.  
 
In 2008, big banks decreased the growth of their lending to corporations and companies by 20% 
to 34%. Same with Cull & Martinez Peria (2013)’s finding in the Eastern Europe, where big 
banks with more assets were lending about 6% to 7% less than smaller banks in year 2008. In 
the same year, banks with high liquidity lent 11 to 13 times more to corporations; Banks with 
higher deposit funding ratio also supplied more than twice more credit to corporations in 2008. 
Banks with high profitability had 90 times less growth in corporate lending.  
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In 2009, banks with higher capitalization had 7 to 8 times lower growth of corporate loans. 
Similar to year 2008, banks with higher profitability showed even larger decline in the growth 
of corporate loans in 2009, which was about 120 times less. In the same year, banks with 
higher deposit funding also had more than twice higher growth of corporate loans.  
 
Taken into account of the regression results from both the total gross loans and corporate 
loans, it is conspicuous that the significant positive growth in total gross loans from 
government banks can be partially explained by the significant positive growth in corporate 
loans from government banks in year 2008. Similarly, the significant positive growth in total 
gross loans from domestic private banks can also be partially explained by the significant 
positive growth in corporate loans from domestic private banks in year 2009.  
 
5.2.2 The growth of private loans 
 
Similar method is applied on the regression analysis on the growth of private loans. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 7. 
 
During non-crisis years, it can be seen that banks with foreign ownership tend to have two to 
three times significant slower growth of private loans than that of banks with joint ownership 
during non-crisis years. Banks with government ownership also tend to have a slower growth 
of private loans than the banks with joint ownership during non-crisis years. Similarly, banks 
with domestic private ownership tend to have less growth in private loans comparing to the 
banks with joint ownership as well. As for banks’ financial variables during non-crisis years, 
bank size has a negative influence on the growth of private loans; Equity ratio has a positive 
impact on the growth of private loans; Profitability has negative effect on the growth of 
private loans the coefficients in the first two specifications are significant at 10% statistical 
significance level; Liquidity and deposit funding ratio have negative influences on the growth 
of private loans.  
 
In crisis years, year 2008 seems to have negative influence on the growth of private loans, 
whereas year 2009 has mixed results. In 2008, foreign ownership has a negative impact on the 
growth of private loans; government ownership and domestic private ownership have mixed 
results. In 2009, foreign ownership has mixed results; government ownership and domestic 
private ownership have positive influences on the growth of private loans.  
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As for banks’ financial variables in the recent financial crisis, in 2008, bank size, equity ratio 
and liquidity exhibit positive effect on the growth of private loans; Profitability and deposit 
funding ratio came with mixed results. In 2009, bank size, profitability and liquidity have 
positive impact on the growth of private loans; Equity ratio has mixed results from the 
regressions and deposit funding ratio have negative influences on the growth of private loans. 
The regressions have values of R-squared range from 9% to 17%. 
 
In conclusion, in non-crisis years, banks with foreign ownership already tended to have a 
significant growth rate of private loans that is approximately two times less compare to the 
banks with joint ownership. This matches with the phenomenon in China as foreign banks’ 
business in China is mainly focused on corporate lending for the time being. In addition, 
banks with high profit tended to lend less to households and individuals during non-crisis 
years. 
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5.3 Loan growth by different industries 
 
Besides separate studies on corporate and private loans, a more detailed study on loan 
growths by industry categorization is carried out. The industries studied are the four major 
industries in China that attract most credit supply and also of prime importance in the 
country’s economic development. These four industries are real estate, construction, 
wholesale & retail and manufacture industries. The regression analysis is illustrated as 
follows: 
 
5.3.1 The growth of real estate loans 
 
Real estate industry is one of the most important industries that contribute to the high growth 
of Chinese GDP in the recent years. The regression results on the growth of loans to real 
estate industry are presented in Table 8. 
 
During non-crisis years, banks with foreign ownership tend to have slower growth of real 
estate loans comparing to banks with joint ownership; Banks with government ownership and 
banks with domestic private ownership have mixed results from the regressions. As for banks’ 
financial variables during non-crisis years, bank size, equity ratio and liquidity have negative 
influence on the growth of real estate loans and bank size has a negative coefficient of around 
-5% that is significant at 10% statistical significance level; Profitability has a positive impact 
on the growth of real estate loans; Deposit funding ratio comes with mixed results. 
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In crisis years, year 2008 has mixed results from the regressions and year 2009 has a positive 
effect on the growth of real estate loans. For banks with different ownerships during the 
financial crisis, in 2008, foreign ownership has a significant positive 69% to 74% impact on 
the growth of real estate loans; government ownership and domestic private ownership have 
mixed results. In 2009, all three types of bank ownerships come with mixed results on the 
growth of real estate loans. As for banks’ financial variables in the recent financial crisis, in 
2008, bank size and profitability exhibit positive effect on the growth of real estate loans, 
where bank size has significant negative impact of 15% less on growth of real estate loans at 
10% statistical significance level; Equity ratio, liquidity and deposit funding ratio show 
positive impact on the growth of real estate loans, where equity ratio has 15 times more 
significant positive impact on the growth of real estate loans. In 2009, bank size and 
profitability tend to have negative impact on the growth of real estate loans; Equity ratio, 
liquidity and deposit funding ratio have mixed results from the regressions. Moreover, the 
regressions have values of R-squared range from 6% to 13%. 
 
In conclusion, in non-crisis years, big banks with larger assets were lending at about 5% less 
growth rate of real estate loans. During the financial crisis, big banks even decreased more till 
around 15% growth rate of lending in real estate loans in 2008. In the same year, banks with 
foreign ownership had 69% to 74% higher growth rate than that of banks with joint ownership. 
In addition, banks with high equity ratio were lending at approximately 15 times more growth 
rate of real estate loans in 2008. 
 
5.3.2 The growth of construction loans 
 
Next, the regressions on the growth of construction loans are presented in Table 9. 
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During non-crisis years, banks with foreign ownership tend to have higher growth of 
construction loans comparing to banks with joint ownership; Banks with government 
ownership also seem to have higher growth rate than joint ownership banks, but the 
coefficients are smaller than that of foreign ownership banks. It is noteworthy that banks with 
domestic private ownership have 22% to 32% significant less growth of construction loans 
than that of banks with joint ownership at 5% significant level.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables during non-crisis years, bank size is 6% to 10% significant 
negative impact on the growth of construction loans at 5% statistical significance level; equity 
ratio and deposit funding ratio have mixed results from the regressions on the growth of 
construction loans; Profitability has a positive significant impact that ranges from 43 to 72 
times more on the growth of construction loans at 5% statistical significance level. 
 
In crisis years, year 2008 has mixed results from the regressions and year 2009 has a negative 
effect on the growth of construction loans. The significant coefficient suggests that in 2009 
the growth of construction loans has decreased by about 57%. For banks with different 
ownerships during the financial crisis, in 2008, foreign ownership has a significant negative 
2.6 to 2.8 times impact on the growth of construction loans at 5% statistical significance level; 
government ownership and domestic private ownership have mixed results from the 
regressions. In 2009, banks with foreign ownership still have negative growth about -45% of 
construction loans comparing to banks with joint ownership at 10% statistical significance 
level. On the other hand, government ownership has mixed results from the regressions. In the 
same year, banks with domestic private ownership show a significant positive growth at 
around 41% to 75% of real estate loans comparing to banks with joint ownership.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables in the recent financial crisis, in 2008, bank size has negative 
effect on the growth of construction loans at a significant range of -15% to -12% at 5% 
statistical significance level; Equity ratio has positive significant impact on the growth of 
construction loans at a range of 23 to 29 times at 5% statistical significance level. Moreover, 
profitability exhibit significant negative effect on the growth of construction loans at -87 to -
80 times at 5% statistical significance level. On the other hand, liquidity show positive impact 
on the growth of construction loans and it is at a significant range of six to seven times at 5% 
statistical significance level. Additionally, deposit funding ratio has mixed results from the 
regressions. In year 2009, bank size still has negative impact on the growth of construction 
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loans; Equity ratio has mixed results from the regression; Profitability has even higher 
significant negative impact on the growth of construction at a range of -107 to -100 times. 
Moreover, liquidity still exhibits negative impact on the growth of construction loans and 
deposit funding ratio tends to have positive impact on the growth of construction loans. 
Besides, the regressions on the growth of construction loans have values of R-squared range 
from 21% to 28%. 
 
In conclusion, in non-crisis years, domestic private banks had 22% to 32% less growth than 
that of joint ownership banks. Moreover, big banks with larger assets were lending at about 6% 
to 10% less growth rate of real estate loans than banks with less assets. In addition, profitable 
banks were lending 43 to 72 times more construction loans than less profitable banks. During 
the financial crisis, crisis year 2009 caused a decrease in the growth of construction loans to 
all banks at a rate of 57%. In 2008, foreign banks were lending 2.6 to 2.8 times less in 
construction industry than banks with joint ownership. In 2009, foreign banks were lending 
around 45% less in the construction industry than banks with joint ownership; domestic banks 
were lending around 41% to 75% more in the construction industry than banks with joint 
ownership. This also indicates that domestic private banks were lending more in construction 
industry than that of foreign banks in crisis year 2009. In 2008, big banks with larger assets 
were lending 12% to 15% less in construction industry compared to year 2007. However, 
banks with high equity were lending 23 to 29 times more in construction industry than that of 
year 2007. In addition, banks with high profit in 2007 were lending 80 to 87 times less in 
construction industry in year 2008. However, banks with high liquidity in 2007 were lending 
six to seven times more in construction loans in crisis year 2008. In 2009, banks with high 
equity in 2008 were lending 100 to 107 times less in construction loans in crisis year 2009. 
 
5.3.3 The growth of wholesale & retail loans 
 
Wholesale & retail industry is the industry that is growing the fastest on average among the 
four major industries that were studied in this thesis during 2006 to 2012. The regressions on 
the growth of wholesale & retail loans are presented below in Table 10. 
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During non-crisis years, banks with foreign ownership tend to have 77% to 109% less growth 
in wholesale & retail loans comparing to banks with joint ownership and all foreign 
ownership coefficients are significant; Banks with government ownership have higher growth 
rate than joint ownership banks in wholesale & retail loans; Banks with domestic private 
ownership also have higher growth rate than banks with joint ownership in wholesale & retail 
loans.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables during non-crisis years, bank size has negative effect on the 
growth of wholesale & retail loans; equity ratio has approximately eight times positive impact 
on the growth of wholesale & retail loans and the coefficient is significant at 10% statistical 
significance level. Both Profitability and deposit funding ratio have positive effect on the 
growth of wholesale & retail loans. However, liquidity ratio has mixed results from the 
regressions. 
 
In crisis years, year 2008 has -36% negative impact on the growth of wholesale & retail loans 
and the coefficient is significant at 1% level; year 2009 also has a negative effect on the 
growth of wholesale & retail loans. For banks with different ownerships during the financial 
crisis, in 2008, banks with foreign ownership and domestic private ownership have mixed 
results from the regressions; banks with government ownership has significant -51% impact 
on the growth of wholesale & retail loans at 5% statistical significance level comparing to 
banks with joint ownership. In crisis year 2009, banks with foreign ownership, government 
ownership and domestic private ownership all derived mixed results from the regressions.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables in the recent financial crisis, in 2008, bank size has positive 
effect on the growth of wholesale & retail loans; Equity ratio and deposit funding ratio have 
mixed results from the regressions; Profitability exhibit negative effect on the growth of 
wholesale & retail loans; Moreover, liquidity also show negative impact on the growth of 
wholesale & retail loans. In crisis year 2009, bank size still has positive impact on the growth 
of wholesale & retail loans; Equity ratio has significant negative impact on the growth of 
wholesale & retail loans at a range between -10 and -8 times and the coefficients are 
significant at 10% statistical significance level; Profitability also has negative impact on the 
growth of wholesale & retail loans. Moreover, liquidity in 2009 exhibits positive impact on 
the growth of wholesale & retail loans on contrary to the situation in 2008. In addition, 
deposit funding ratio has significant negative impact of -278% on the growth of construction 
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loans and the coefficient is significant at 10% statistical significance level. As for the whole 
model, the regressions on the growth of wholesale & retail loans have values of R-squared at 
around 1%. 
 
In conclusion, in non-crisis years, foreign banks lent about 77% to 109% less in wholesale & 
retail industry than that of banks with joint ownership. Moreover, banks with high equity ratio 
were lending about 8 times more of the growth rate of wholesale & retail loans than banks 
with lower equity ratio. In addition, crisis year 2008 caused 36% decrease in the credit supply 
to wholesale & retail industry comparing the year before. Moreover, government banks were 
lending 51% less to wholesale & retail industry in 2008 than that of banks with joint 
ownership. What’s more, in year 2009, banks with high equity ratio in 2008 were lending 
eight to ten times less in wholesale & retail industry than that of banks with low equity ratio; 
Also, banks with high deposit funding ratio in 2008 were lending about 2.8 times less in 
wholesale & retail industry than that of banks with deposit funding ratio. 
 
5.3.4 The growth of manufacture loans 
 
Last but not the least is the regression on the growth of manufacture loans. The results are 
presented below in Table 11. 
 
During non-crisis years, banks with foreign ownership tended to have 26% to 31% less 
growth in manufacture loans comparing to banks with joint ownership and all foreign 
ownership coefficients are significant at 1% statistical significance level; Banks with 
government ownership have higher growth rate in manufacture loans than that of joint 
ownership banks; Banks with domestic private ownership also have higher growth rate than 
banks with joint ownership in manufacture loans.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables during non-crisis years, bank size has 7% to 8% negative 
effect on the growth of manufacture loans at 10% statistical significance level; equity ratio 
has negative impact on the growth of manufacture loans; Profitability has mixed results from 
the regressions; Liquidity ratio has negative effect on the growth of manufacture loans; 
Deposit funding ratio has 42% to 46% positive effect on the growth of manufacture loans and 
the coefficients are significant at 10% statistical significance level. 
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In crisis years, year 2008 had negative impact on the growth of manufacture loans; Year 2009 
also had a -14% negative effect on the growth of manufacture loans and the coefficient is 
significant at 10% statistical significance level. For banks with different ownerships during 
the financial crisis, in 2008, banks with foreign ownership and government ownership had 
mixed results from the regressions; banks with domestic private ownership had higher growth 
of manufacture loans comparing to banks with joint ownership. In crisis year 2009, banks 
with foreign ownership, government ownership and domestic private ownership all derived 
mixed results from the regressions.  
 
As for banks’ financial variables in the recent financial crisis, in 2008, bank size had positive 
effect on the growth of manufacture loans; Equity ratio also had 11 to 12 times positive effect 
on the growth of manufacture loans; Profitability had negative effect on the growth of 
manufacture loans; Moreover, liquidity also showed positive impact on the growth of 
manufacture loans; Deposit funding ratio had mixed results from the regressions. In crisis 
year 2009, bank size still had positive impact on the growth of manufacture loans; Equity 
ratio had negative impact on the growth of manufacture loans; Profitability and liquidity ratio 
also had positive impact on the growth of manufacture loans; On the other hand, the deposit 
funding ratio had negative effect on the growth of manufacture loans. As for the whole model, 
the regressions on the growth of manufacture loans have values of R-squared at around 4% to 
5%. 
 
In conclusion, in non-crisis years, foreign banks lent about 26% to 31% less in manufacture 
industry than that of banks with joint ownership; Moreover, big banks with large assets were 
lending 7% to 8% less in manufacture industry than that of smaller banks with less assets; In 
addition, banks with more sufficient funding were lending 42% to 46% more than banks with 
less sufficient funding. Moreover, crisis year 2009 caused 14% decrease in the credit supply 
to manufacture industry comparing the year before. Also, banks with high equity in year 2007 
were lending 11 times more in manufacture industry in year 2008. 
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6. Summary and conclusions 
 
In conclusion of the previous sections, the financial crisis in 2008 to 2009 did not have 
significant negative impact on the aggregate bank lending in China (measured by the total 
gross loans). This might be due to 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus program injected by the 
government during the financial crisis and also the strong momentum of Chinese economic 
growth from the past decade. However, significant negative influence of the financial crisis in 
bank lending was found in wholesale & retail industry in year 2008 and construction industry 
as well as manufacture industry in year 2009.  
 
As for the different influences on the bank lending from banks with different ownerships 
during crisis and non-crisis years, it is noteworthy that foreign banks were lending less in total 
gross loans, private loans, wholesale & retail loans and manufacture loans during non-crisis 
years. Moreover, in 2008, foreign banks were lending less in construction industry. However, 
the regression results also suggest that the foreign banks were lending more in real estate 
industry in the same year. Thus, foreign banks were generally lending less in non-crisis years, 
but they did not completely contract their credit supply when the financial crisis struck.  
 
For government banks, there is no significant evidence that they had higher or lower credit 
supply in non-crisis years. Nevertheless, in 2008, government banks were lending 1.2 to 1.8 
times more in corporate loans. This situation is also found in credit supply in construction 
loans, where government banks lent more in both year 2008 and 2009. However, in 2008, 
government banks were lending less in wholesale & retail industry. Therefore, government 
banks were generally supportive during the financial crisis by increasing its credit supply in 
corporate loans, in which they also increased their lending construction industry.  
 
For domestic private banks, they lent significantly less in corporate loans and also 
construction loans during non-crisis years. On the contrary, in both crisis years, domestic 
private banks supplied more credit in total gross loans; in 2009, domestic private banks lent 
more in corporate loans and construction loans. Therefore, it is quite evidential that domestic 
private banks were extremely supportive during the recent financial crisis.  
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To conclude, domestic private banks and government banks were indeed playing a 
strengthening and stabilizing role during the financial crisis. Foreign banks did not contract 
their lending aggressively in general during the crisis. 
 
This thesis also studied how the banks’ balance sheet items had influences on the bank 
lending between year 2005 and 2012. Interestingly, during non-crisis years, big banks with a 
lot of assets tended to lend less in total gross loans and this difference is also shown in real 
estate loans, construction loans and manufacture loans. In the period of financial crisis, big 
banks increased their lending in total gross loans in year 2009 but decreased their lending in 
corporate loans, real estate loans and construction loans in 2008. Therefore, big banks became 
more supportive in the second year of the recent financial crisis.  
 
For banks with high equity ratio, which are also the banks with more capitalization, they lent 
significantly more in total gross loans, corporate loans and wholesale & retail loans in non-
crisis years. During the financial crisis, banks with high capitalization were lending more in 
real estate industry, construction industry and manufacture industry in 2008 but less in 
corporate loans in 2009. This finding suggests that banks with high capitalization are 
generally lending more in the first year of the financial crisis but less in the second year.  
 
For banks with high profitability, they were lending significantly less in total gross loans as 
well as private loans but supplied more in corporate loans and construction loans in non-crisis 
years; In 2008 and 2009, banks with high profitability decreased their lending significantly in 
corporate loans and construction loans. It indicates that banks with high profitability changed 
their credit supply focus in construction industry during the recent financial crisis.  
 
With respect to banks with high solvency, they were supplying more credit in total gross 
loans during non-crisis years. Nonetheless, banks with high solvency had significant decrease 
in total gross loans in both 2008 and 2009. In 2008, they had supplied more in corporate 
lending and construction industry. In 2009, banks with high solvency were lending less in 
corporate loans instead. Therefore, banks with high solvency were not strict with their credit 
supply during non-crisis years, but became stricter and more careful with their loans during 
the period of the financial crisis.  
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For banks with sufficient funding, they tended to have more credit supply in total gross loans 
and manufacture industry during non-crisis time. In 2008, banks with sufficient funding 
supplied more in total gross loans and corporate loans. In 2009, they had more lending in 
corporate loans but less in wholesale & retail industry. Hence, banks with sufficient funding 
were rather generous with their loans during non-crisis years and the first year of the financial 
crisis. However, they have become more selective on their credit supply in the second year of 
the recent financial crisis.  
 
As discussed in detail in the previous section, the main results and conclusions of this paper 
are in line with the previous researches. Some differences do exist but it is due to country 
specific context.  
 
Many previous researches also tried to explain the reasons behind the differences of bank 
ownership’s impact on bank lending, such as the proximity between the foreign subsidiaries 
and the parent multinational banks, etc. This can be the possible extension of this topic for 
further researches. 
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